By Syed S. Hussain
New York
In this article the second factor, which inhibited the progress of democracy in Pakistan, will be addressed. This factor can be referred to as the ‘ideological confusion’ which prevails in Pakistan. In this regard two aspects are worth looking into. Firstly, what the controversy is and why? Secondly, how has it affected the political development in Pakistan.
If one were to look at the rationale for the creation of Pakistan, the cornerstone would appear to be the ‘two-nation theory’; that the Hindus and Muslims were two different nations and entitled to separate geographical territory. Underlying this theory was the perception that the Muslims of India, after departure of the British, would not get a fair deal from the Hindu majority. This theory, although not accepted by many including a section of the Muslims, finally paved the way for the creation of Pakistan.
Independence, however, did not settle the issue regarding the ideology. The question as to what ideology Pakistan should follow has become an explosively contentious and an unresolved issue since then. A group lead by the religious parties wants the country to be governed by Islamic Laws, as according to them Pakistan was created in the name of Islam. Then there are those who want Pakistan to be a democratic welfare state on the lines envisioned by the founder of the nation, Mr. M. A. Jinnah.
What ideological perception did the founder of the nation, Quaid-i-Azam, have about Pakistan? Addressing the Constituent Assembly on August 11, 1947, Mr. Jinnah declared: “You may belong to any religion or caste or creed….that has nothing to do with the business of the state …we are starting with this fundamental principle that we are all citizens and citizens of one state.”
Explaining his philosophy further, in February 1948, Quaid-i-Azam said: “In any case Pakistan is not going to be a theocratic state ruled by priests with a divine mission.” Jinnah’s deputy and the first Prime Minister, Liaquat Ali Khan, had similar views. Addressing the Constituent Assembly in March 1949, he said: “The people are the real recipients of power. This naturally eliminates the danger of establishment of a theocracy.”
So what really was to be the ideological framework of Pakistan? According to eminent jurist, Dr. Javed Iqbal, both Quaid-i-Azam and Allama Iqbal wanted the establishment of modern Islamic democratic welfare state in Pakistan.
Now let us see what ideology was envisaged for Pakistan, by the religious leaders and thinkers at the time of the struggle for independence. Here we come to a glaring omission. Most of the prominent religious organizations and leaders did not subscribe to the idea of Pakistan itself, let alone about its possible ideology! Jamiat Ulema-i-Hind, Majlis-i-Ahra-Islam and Jamat-i-Islami not only rejected the idea of Pakistan, but bitterly opposed it. Some even supported the Congress’ concept of Indian nationalism.
Hence, it is rather strange to witness the religious parties in Pakistan now becoming the torchbearer of the country’s ideology, demanding a theocratic state, contrarily to what was envisaged by the founders of the country. To find a credible answer to this apparent contradiction, we again have to look into the history of the making of Pakistan.
There is no doubt that Quaid-i-Azam, Iqbal and other leading figures of the Muslim League did not want a theocratic state. However, it is also a fact that in the later stages of Pakistan struggle especially, a lot of Islamic symbolism had crept into the movement. In a way this was unavoidable. After all the two-nation theory itself had religious connotations. Then there were many religious leaders, especially from the Braeilvi School, who supported Pakistan. Even some Ulemas from the opposing Deoband school of Jamiat ul Hind broke away from the mainstream to support the Pakistan struggle.
As the struggle heated up it became imperative for the Muslim League leadership to seek the support of religious leaders. During the Constituent Assembly elections of 1946, the Muslim League was hard-pressed to show results to be taken seriously as the spokesperson of the Muslims of India, especially of the Muslim majority provinces. At this juncture the support of prominent religious leaders, like that of Pir of Manki Sharif, became invaluable. Such support was generally received on the promise of governing Pakistan on Islamic basis.
Therefore, it cannot be denied that a certain degree of religious undertone was present in the movement for Pakistan. Slogans like “Pakistan ka Matlab Kia; La Illaha Illal La”, though not officially endorsed by Mr. Jinnah or the Muslim League high command, nevertheless, were used by many proponents of Pakistan, especially as election slogans. These may have been simply a zealous expression of Muslim feelings, but these symbolisms, after independence became the basis for the religious parties to demand the establishment of a theocratic order in Pakistan.
Now a look at how this continuing debate about the ideology has affected politics in Pakistan. It is left to conjecture as to what picture would have emerged had Quaid-i-Azam lived longer and managed a constitution for Pakistan. But unfortunately that did not happen. What happened instead could best be described, as an acrimony-laced political culture taking control in Pakistan. From the time Objective Resolutions were drafted in 1949 to the present time, the vexing question has been whether Pakistan is to be a theocratic state or a modern democracy. In the ensuing confusion we have neither.
As would be expected this identity crisis has been liberally exploited by all rulers as and when it suited them. The slogan ‘Islam in danger’ has been tellingly used for their own survival. In the process very often the religious parties have ended up supporting dictators, and becoming tools in stifling the democratic process in the country.
The Pakistani population has diverse religious groupings. Ulema of various schools find it difficult to agree on substantive issues facing the people and the nation, especially under modern-day imperatives. Their antagonism for each other is well illustrated by an interesting comment in the inquiry findings of the 1953 anti-Qadiani riots in Lahore by Justice Munir: “No two Ulema agreed before us as to the definition of a Muslim.”
If they could not agree on something so basic, larger and more complex issues could hardly find consensus among them. The situation is no better now, with more militancy and hostility amongst various groups. This situation is hardly conducive to democratic progression, and has led to fragmented and instable political environment in the country, susceptible to adventurism by non-political forces.
(Syed S. Hussain is a political analyst. He has post-graduate degrees in Political Science, International Relations, History and Law. E-mail: Sharafain@aol.com)