By Syed S. Hussain
New York
Ask politicians in Pakistan about the reasons of failure of democracy in the country, and most will lay the blame squarely on the army. Ask the same question to an army officer, and one is likely to hear about the misdeeds of the politicians, and the ‘out-of-necessity’ involvement of the army in the politics of Pakistan.
Put the same question to members of the general public, and they would blame either one of them or maybe both! To assess these divergent explanations, let us take a look at the army’s involvement in the politics of Pakistan.
Pakistan army is generally a disciplined and professional force. Also, as an organization, it is not known to be beset with widespread corruption. So why should it be so much involved in the politics of Pakistan, realizing quite well that its periodic incursion in national affairs is not helping the country?
Here lies a monumental contradiction of perception. Many in the army (and many outside the army) actually believe the army serves the country’s interest by making incursions on corrupt political dispensations. According to this line of reasoning the army is left with no choice but to do what it periodically does!
At the time of partition, the Pakistan army, which has evolved from the old British Indian army, started with certain advantages over the political setup. The army units which made up the Pakistan army, though under-strength and ill-equipped, were by far the best organized force available. By contrast, the political setup was not much of a comparison.
The Muslim League, which became the ruler of the country, hardly had the organizational setup or the experience of running a state. It relied heavily on the towering personality of Mr. Jinnah. With the death of the Quaid in 1948 and the assassination of his lieutenant Liaquat Ali Khan in 1951, the political leadership became rudderless. By default it was left to the army to fill the vacuum. The army’s involvement in the affairs of the country came soon after independence, as a result of fighting that erupted because of Kashmir’s accession to India, by its ruler. Pakistan army was tacitly involved in this fighting. A ceasefire was brokered in January 49, which left part of Kashmir in Pakistan’s control and a much bigger part in Indian control.
In February 1951, Major General Akbar Khan, who was involved in the fighting in Kashmir, was apprehended and sentenced, along with 16 others, for conspiring to overthrow the civilian government of Liaquat Ali Khan and install a military government. Around this time, Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan was assassinated. These events prompted many to believe of major differences within the army, with regard to the civilian government’s handling of the Kashmir issue.
In the aftermath, the Kashmir issue became a national agenda and the army its custodian. Thus the army became a major player in the strategic affairs of the country. This allowed Ayub Khan, who became the army chief in 1951 and defense minister in 1953, to exploit his office in making and breaking (six Prime Ministers: 1951-58) of the governments, till he finally decided to takeover power himself in 1958. Many even believe that he had a behind-the-scene role in the sacking of the First Constituent Assembly, which was the first of the many blows that the democratic process was to receive in Pakistan.
Ayub Khan abrogated Pakistan’s first (1956) constitution. The most far-reaching aspect, however, of his ten-year rule was his concept of controlled (Basic) democracy for the people of Pakistan. This has remained the rationale of all subsequent military rulers for customizing democracy according to their own geniuses.
When Ayub Khan’ rule ended (through another martial law) in March 1969, the fait of a united Pakistan was more or less sealed. The elections of 1970 and the personalities of Yahya Khan, Sheikh Mujib, and Z.A. Bhutto only hastened the task. Jinnah’s Pakistan passed into history.
The breakup of Pakistan was followed by five-and-a-half years of civilian rule of Mr. Bhutto, which was not exactly a model of democracy. He did, however, succeed in giving the country a constitution (1973), which may be his enduring achievement. This constitution, despite repeated battering, has survived.
General Zia ul Haq initiated a major setback to the constitution in July 1977, when he deposed Bhutto and held it in ‘abeyance’. He followed Ayub’s concept of controlled democracy by introducing the partyless ‘Shooracracy’. He also added a dimension of his own in the politics of Pakistan.
Partly for his own survival and partly to reap the windfall in Afghanistan, as a result of the Soviet invasion, he used religion to achieve his political ends. When Zia departed from the scene in August 1988, he left behind the legacy of a badly mauled constitution, militancy and violence on religious, ethnic, and sectarian lines.
In the next decade civilian governments came and went, with army playing a behind-the-scene role. Then in October 1999, General Musharraf heralded the fourth military takeover in Pakistan. In his case it can be said that the military takeover was triggered by the civilian government, when Nawaz Sharif decided to depose him, literally in mid-air. Whatever the cause, the result was a cessation of the democratic process. Now reverberations of Musharraf’s ‘sustainable democracy’ that are in progress can be felt.
The above chronology of events shows that the army has been the dominant power during most of Pakistan’s history. The politicians cannot escape a role in this. Whenever in power, they never really put their house in order. Further the politicians, by and large, have worked quite smoothly with the army during army takeovers, opposing only when left out of the power-sharing equation. The judiciary too has played its part in legitimizing the military takeovers (except Yahya’s and that too after the event) by using the window of “Doctrine of Necessity”.
Now the question if the periodic meddling by the army has been responsible for not allowing the civilians enough space to grow? Also has the army connived to make the civilians fail?
The answer to the first question has to be in the affirmative. Democratic principles cannot be inculcated overnight. Even the successful democracies of today have had to grapple with great periods of uncertainty before achieving positive results. In Pakistan this continuity has been missing.
The answer to the second question is not that easy. One can only go by the events which have taken place and draw his/her own deductions. There is not much doubt regarding the involvement of Ayub Khan in meddling with the civilian setup, before he took over. Thereafter, it is the cause and effect coming into play. The result, however, is quite easy to assess: retardation of democratic process in the country!
(Concluded)
Syed S. Hussain is a political analyst. He has post-graduate degrees in Political Science, International Relations, History and Law. E-mail: Sharafain@aol.com