As the Afghan War percolates along, all the players are being forced to adjust to unexpected events and surprises. This has forced an adjustment in the strategies of America and Pakistan, and the role of Benazir Bhutto is becoming ever more interesting.
American frustration at the events of the last 4 weeks is obvious.
When the air campaign began, few American observers expected the Taliban to have remained fully in control of the country after several weeks of air bombardment. The basic expectation was that the air campaign was going to break the Taliban morale, the Taliban would collapse into feuding Pashtun warlords who could be bribed or persuaded to join an anti-Taliban coalition, and the Taliban would simply fall apart. This has not happened.
In fact, judging by the recent attempt of some Pakistani tribal people to cross the border with their rifles and join them, the Taliban are gaining supporters. The Taliban have also neutralized America’s airpower within the cities of Afghanistan by parking their vehicles and billeting their soldiers within people’s homes and even in Masjids. This makes it almost impossible politically for America to bomb them. With winter approaching time is running out to achieve any semblance of victory quickly. In addition, the policy of trying to create a Pashtun opposition has collapsed as the Pashtuns can’t agree among themselves, and the most charismatic anti-Taliban Pashtun Abdul Haq got himself killed on a quixotic foray into Afghanistan.
America has now given up on the idea of taking down the Taliban through a Pashtun opposition. It pursued this strategy partly out of deference to Pakistan, which wants Pashtun elements to be prominent in the post-war government, as it does not trust the Northern Alliance. But now the United States has decided that a ground component is needed, and that can only be provided by the Northern Alliance.
The US has sent in Special Forces to lay the groundwork for closer cooperation, and the American air force has begun a series of strikes on the Taliban frontlines in order to directly help the Northern Alliance, something which it didn’t do earlier in this war. It appears that the US wants the Northern Alliance to seize Mazar-e-Sharif and possibly even Kabul before the winter closes in. To do that, the campaign cannot stop for Ramadan, which is why the US has to fight right through it. The strategy now is that if the two major cities fall, then the Pashtuns will know the Taliban are finished and will be willing to flock to the other side.
Pakistan understands these issues very well. Which is why Musharraf himself stated clearly that the US campaign will not stop for Ramadan. He knows it is better to tell the people in advance; they will then be less upset when it happens. The Pakistanis have also stopped making complaints about the Northern Alliance, and instead are focusing on telling the US how important a broad-based government will be. This is also why Pakistan keeps referring to “moderate Taliban” being a part of the next government.
On the economic front, Pakistan continues to pursue an excellent strategy of shoring up its finances for the next three years, increasing trade access for textiles to Europe and America, and getting debt relief. A new agreement with the IMF is due to be completed soon, and the US Congress is set to vote on giving Bush the authority to raise Pakistan’s textile quota and reduce tariffs on its exports to the US.
The internal politics remain muddy. Musharraf has been meeting with the secular parties but refuses to talk to JI or JUI. The religious parties continue to demonstrate against his support of the US. Musharraf realizes that time is not on his side. He needs the war over the sooner the better, which partly explains why Pakistan is not protesting the tilt to the Northern Alliance. Having the Northern Alliance win quickly is now seen as better than having someone else win but much more slowly. PML (Nawaz) broke ranks with the other parties and opposed the war recently, but could not organize any demonstrations. The other parties remain supportive of Musharraf. For them, they know that with elections due in less than twelve months, it makes no sense to destroy a country that they might have to run soon.
Benazir Bhutto knows that very well. She has been very supportive of both America and Musharraf in this whole process. If she had wanted to, she could have mobilized the PPP against the war and created havoc in Pakistan. But she knows that if she plays her cards right, she will be Prime Minister very soon, and it is therefore better to inherit a stable country than one in geopolitical ruin. To clear the way to next October, she needs to make sure that neither the United States nor Musharraf will oppose her. By supporting both during this critical time she is laying the groundwork for her comeback. All she needs from Musharraf is a free election and a guarantee that she will not be prosecuted for corruption if she returns to Pakistan. It is conceivable that such a quid pro quo for her current support has already been given by Musharraf. America will perceive her as a known quantity, and will be willing to work with her. As no other political party has the organization of the PPP combined with a candidate of the stature of Bhutto, it is almost certain that she will win next October, as long as she gets to run.