It’s been 10 years since the start of the secret Oslo negotiations that led to a direct contact between the Israeli government and the PLO. Final status, which of course meant a Palestinian state on the West Bank and Gaza with a capital in East Jerusalem, was supposed to have been achieved almost 5 years ago. But instead, there are many claiming that Oslo is dead. That is clearly not true, as the main result of Oslo, the withdrawal of Israeli direct rule over Palestinian cities and towns and the creation of the Palestinian Authority in its place, remains shakily intact. Even Ariel Sharon, the man who told Sadat 25 years ago that there would be 2 million Jews on the West Bank by now, and that the Palestinians would be forced into Jordan, has accepted the inevitability of (truncated in his mind) Palestine.
So why are we now in this impasse? What has gone so wrong for the Palestinians? To my mind, the Palestinian situation bears great many similarities to the Muslims of British India. In both cases, they represented an alternate national identity to the most powerful one in place. Both Palestinians and the Muslims of British India faced incredible obstacles in achieving their goals of statehood. In both situations, the role of an outside power (Britain in India, America in Israel/Palestine) was or is critical to the outcome. And that power was not favorable to the Muslim agenda. Both the Indian Muslims and the Palestinians lacked the military power to generate a solution by armed struggle. In both areas, the Muslims lacked significant help from outside parties. Finally, in both areas, there was a great sense of historical loss, as onetime masters of the land were now faced with possibly permanent second class status.
But the crucial difference between the two has been leadership. Jinnah was able to overcome all these terrible difficulties and achieve statehood for India’s Muslims. Despite the ups and downs of Pakistan and Bangladesh, the vast majority of their citizens are grateful for their independence from India and the inevitable Hindu Raj. How he did it, with his sickly and tuberculosis-riddled body, outmaneuvering the cream of India’s and Britain’s politicians, is a tremendous historical tale.
Jinnah did several things right. He knew the road to Pakistan ran through London, and never directly challenged or angered the British. Two million Indians served in the British army during World War Two, half, like my uncle, recruited from Muslim Punjab. Jinnah never tried to seriously disrupt recruiting, although one could ask why Punjabis should die for England. He knew the critical value of British goodwill toward the Muslim League.
Jinnah had clarity of purpose and vision. He would accept whatever plan gave him his basic desire. He wanted to ensure a fair deal for the Muslims in post-colonial setup, and accepted an earlier plan that called for a unified but weak central government and that allowed Muslim states to group together at a lower level below the federal. Nehru and Congress rejected this, and made Pakistan inevitable, which Jinnah then pursued with single-minded fervor.
Jinnah also was wise enough to avoid active armed struggle. He knew Pakistan was to be won on the moral level primarily. It was the work done with the pen, not the gun, which allowed Pakistan to be born. Armed struggle would have too many negative consequences, no matter its emotional appeal to “freedom”. Jinnah knew that you do not take on your opponent where he has strength, but rather where he is weak.
Jinnah’s greatest asset was his cold, taciturn, and aloof personality. Not the kind of qualities looked for in a best friend, but perfect for the job he was asked by history to do. In a terribly complex and emotional situation, with all the historical baggage carried by India s Muslims, it was critical that Jinnah could analyze with cool detachment the possibilities and achieve the absolute best deal that could be had. Jinnah and the Muslim League wanted all of Punjab and Bengal (including Calcutta) along with Kashmir in Pakistan. Instead, he was offered a partitioned Bengal and Punjab, and an unclear Kashmir outcome. Jinnah knew it was the best he could get, and took it. No second thoughts.
Finally, Jinnah never did anything to sour British public opinion on the concept of Pakistan. Jinnah knew that was critical to the outcome and acted accordingly.
Arafat by contrast has been terribly ineffective. He still has yet to clarify to his own people what the Palestinians want. His complete refusal to recognize that Israeli public opinion could be his greatest asset and act on it has hurt the Palestinians tremendously. And he still does not realize that the road to Palestine runs through the White House, just as much as the road to Pakistan ran through London. The Intifada that has taken 900 Palestinian lives and wounded 15,000 has failed to generate sympathy for his cause due to the crazy suicide bombers unleashed on Israel. Besides, it is lunacy for the Palestinians to think that Palestine will be achieved with rocks and suicide bombers. The latest stupidities were the ship caught trying to smuggle Katyusha rockets into Gaza from Iran, and the homemade short-range rockets being fired on Israel. His emotional outbursts when interviewed are painful to watch. He lacks the desire or ability to judge what can be achieved and what cannot and then pursue it with skill. His diplomatic failure at Camp David, where Clinton literally begged him (“Give me something I can work with”) to place a counteroffer on the table, was the real cause of the current impasse. Clinton desperately wanted to crown his Presidency with a Mid-East peace deal, and would have forced Israel to accept any reasonable Palestinian counteroffer to Barak’s best offer.
The contrast between Arafat and Jinnah could not be starker. If Arafat were Jinnah, the Palestinians would have their state.
— Comments can reach me at Nali@socal.rr.com