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December 13, 2002
Afghanistan Merits More Attention
A year after the collapse of the Taliban rule and the installation of Hamid Karzai as the head of a new administration, Afghanistan appears to be far from the vision of a secure, thriving, throbbing society that was presented rhetorically at the UN-sponsored Bonn conference of selected Afghan dignitaries in late November, 2001. The country continues to be mired in poverty, insecurity and ruthlessness of regional warlords and tribal chieftains. It is back to the pre-Taliban gun rule.
The resurgence of local warlords, who were lying dormant or gone into hibernation during the Taliban regime, has placed security, rather than reconstruction, at the top of the new Afghan administration’s agenda.
The writ of Karzai appears restricted to Kabul only. Rest of the country looks like a patchwork of fiefdoms run whimsically by competing warlords, tribal chieftains and militia commanders. Even in Kabul, Karzai presides over a wobbly government devoid of the requisite revenues and the security forces to inspire respect and obedience.
The economy being in shambles, official sources of revenue are almost negligible. Its famous fruit orchards -a good source of income- have withered away owing to the destruction in the war of the irrigation systems. Insecurity has finished the country’s tourism industry. Even the day-to-day expenses of the administration have to be met from external aid. Forty per cent of the foreign aid goes towards the administrative expenses. Bulk of the remainder goes to humanitarian needs. Little is left for reconstruction work.
At the international Tokyo conference on rehabilitation of Afghanistan, a sum of $4.5 billion, as against $10 billion deemed necessary by the UN, was pledged over five years by the donors. Of this, $1.2 billion was received, but the bulk of it had to be disbursed as humanitarian assistance. With the exception of the Kabul-Herat road, no major development project could be launched. Afghanistan receives the lowest level of aid among all those countries that have recently gone through traumatic experiences including wars. It receives $75 per head as against $250 per head for Bosnia, East Timor, Kosovo, and Rwanda.
The US Congress has recently granted $3 billion in assistance to Afghanistan over the next four years. But, of this no less than $1 billion will be spent on extending the international peacekeeping force beyond Kabul and another $300 million on grants and loans to private businesses. The remaining $425 million a year on reconstruction projects works out to $17 per person per year.
The aid situation may not be buoyant but it certainly is not hopeless.
Afghans are a hardy and self-respecting people. And, the Karzai team appears fully aware of what needs to be done and is devoted as much to its responsibility. He has the good luck and distinction of being acceptable as leader of Afghanistan by all groups -the monarchists, the Islamists, the tribal chiefs, and the international community led by the United States.
Since he is unable to put the warlords in their proper place and enforce his writ throughout the country, an impression has gained currency that he is but a figure-head, a Pushtun puppet imposed by the Americans to placate Afghanistan’s biggest tribe which had backed the Taliban. Below him is an administration loaded with Tajiks who hold all key positions.
Early this month (December, 02), Karzai made the bold announcement banning private militias in favor of the creation of a national army of some 70,000 soldiers. He has now a force of less than 3,000 persons in uniform. His decision to ban private militias is a brave political act and needs to be supported by the United States, anti-terrorism coalition allies, and all well-wishers of Afghanistan.
There is a 4,800 strong International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), drawn from 22 countries, stationed by the UN in Afghanistan. Its one-year tenure was extended last November by another year. These foreign troops are stationed primarily in Kabul and provide protection to foreign nationals engaged on various assignments there. Their number and area of operation is yet to be extended. The US congress has, as already mentioned above, allocated recently $1 billion over four years for this purpose.
Afghans’ sense of self-respect verges on xenophobia. The two-decade long war in that country has turned the people into introverts and suspicious of all foreigners. Expansion of the international security force (ISAF) might therefore turn out to be counter-productive.
The Afghans do not think twice before attributing any set-back to their people to some machination of the “foreign devils”. At the same time they look towards foreign powers, particularly the US, for help in rehabilitating their shattered society.
Given this situation, the State Dept. and the Pentagon would be well-advised to take concrete measures for the building up and training of a small force of 70,000 Afghans instead of expanding the international security force.
Warlords and private militias pose the severest challenge to central government’s authority. With such an army at its disposal, Karzai and his successors would be in a better position to take care of the power-hungry, corrupt warlords.
Unfortunately, the US policy makers have developed a myopic view of their relations with the Afghan people. Since the 9/11 catastrophe, their vision has been colored by the immediate demands of their anti-terrorism, anti-Al-Qaeda obsessions and objectives. On his success in ‘regime change’ in Afghanistan, President Bush presented a vision of progressive and prosperous Afghanistan through a kind of his own version of Marshall Plan for that country. His focus has since shifted to a ‘regime change’ in Iraq. Afghanistan and the talk of a Marshall Plan for its reconstruction have receded into the background. The country’s significance remains only in the context of the pursuit of Al-Qaeda.
In this context it may be mentioned that some senior members of Bush administration have been meeting direct certain warlords who have been, it is reported, provided funds and arms in consideration of information on Al-Qaeda operatives. This may serve some short-term purpose, but it derogates the prestige of Karzai administration.
Most of the Americans in Afghanistan are too busy now chasing the shadows of the remnants of Al-Qaeda to spare any time, money or effort to rehabilitation efforts.
To sum up, a year after the suffocating regime of Taliban, there is much freedom in the country, but many Afghans still dream of a secure, law-abiding society, a better life with opportunities to labor and live well, and a durable government. These are quite legitimate and fairly modest expectations considering the calamities borne by them during more than 20 years of conflicts, crises and wars. An augmentation of the help to this country, particularly to enable it to take care of its security problems, will not only be laudable from humanitarian point of view but also as a long-term investment in the future of a strategically located country.
Arifhussaini@hotmail.com
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