The above is the title of the Urdu version of a book which reveals lucidly many behind the scene maneuverings in the corridors of power in Pakistan over the past four decades. It was published last year by the Oxford University Press, Karachi, not long after its original English version, Pakistan: A Dream Gone Sour, was put on the market and had created considerable stir and interest at home and abroad. Copies of the English edition having all been sold out, I could get a copy of the Urdu version only.

That the book has been written by Roedad Khan, a senior CSP officer, who has held top administrative jobs for decades and has had the advantage of working direct with five Presidents of the country and of having intimate contacts with the sixth, is cause enough to excite the curiosity of those interested in Pakistan’s history in the making. His eye witness accounts of events which caused crucial turns and twists in the march of events, his portrayal of the personalities of the Presidents and Prime Ministers, and his assessment of what ails the society have all added to the attraction and value of the book. The Urdu translation by another senior bureaucrat, I. A. Imtiazi, is exceptionally good. One does not gain the impression that one is reading a translation.The text keeps flowing in chaste Urdu and there are negligible printing errors. Given below is a synopsis of his more significant comments.

• Ayub Khan had to make no extensive preparations to grab power. To stage a coup, an army chief doesn’t need extensive preparation. It is not in the tradition or culture of Pakistan to resist usurpers of power.

• Ayub had set a bad precedent by involving the army in politics.

• The argument that conditions had become so bad that Gen. Zia had to impose the Martial Law is not tenable. It was a political decision of the army. The very moment army had decided to boot out Bhutto, death became his destiny.

• Bhutto had many weaknesses. He was fickle minded, arrogant, vindictive and had no qualms in resorting to all means, fair or foul, to achieve his objective. He was intolerant of any one who excelled him in any respect even in looks. Yet after the Quaid, Bhutto was the only leader to instill self-respect among the common people. His five-year rule was a love affair between him and the masses. Once he reached the apex of his power, he became a different person. The ugly side of his personality took over. His love for himself overwhelmed all other considerations. He lost touch with the people and surrounded himself with sycophants, both civil and military. The base of his power collapsed.

• Like the other usurpers of power, Gen. Zia too had the basic problem of securing people’s endorsement of his illegal takeover. His power came through the barrel of the gun. It had no roots among the people. Ayub had held a Presidential ballot in which the voters were asked whether they had confidence in him. Zia held similarly a fraudulent referendum to secure a legal basis for his position.

• Prime Minister Junejo did not challenge his dismissal by Gen. Zia because its futility was obvious. Even the judiciary does not declare a living and in power C-in-C as an illegal usurper of power. Such an army chief is fully free to do what he likes. He may cancel the constituion, disband national and provincial assemblies and dismiss elected governments; there would be no fearful flak. For instance, Gen. Zia dismissed the national and provincial assemblies on May 29, 1988 but judgement against his action was given by the judiciary a month after he died in an air crash in August 1988. The judgement held his actions as unconstitutional.

• President Zia’s Islamisation agenda was superficial, symbolic, and cosmetic. It therefore left no significant impact on the society. Gen. Zia was modest, noble and kind hearted but lacked integrity and honesty. He loved power. His concept of Islam was not much different from that of a cleric, a Mulla.

• President Ghulam Ishaq Khan dissolved two National Assemblies and dismissed two Federal Governments. He dismissed Benazir in August, 1990 and Nawaz Sharif in April 1993. The charges against both governments were almost identical –corruption, dishonesty, nepotism and abuse of power for personal pelf. The Supreme Court held the first dismissal as valid while declaring the second as illegal and unjustified. This was so perhaps because President Ishaq had lost the support of the army by the second time.

• During Ghulam Ishaq’s Presidency, six references against Benazir’s corruption were filed with the judiciary but for two long years there was no judgement on a single case although solid evidence was presented in support of all references. A judge and his son were killed in Karachi and the others, listening to corruption cases, were being threatened and terrorized. Once Benazir returned to power, all six references were dismissed with a lightening speed. Benazir was in the seat of power while President Ishaq had left the Presidency.

• The word “accountability” thus came to be regarded in the corridors of power as an abuse. Once Ghulam Ishaq, who was the lone soldier fighting against corruption, was maneuvered out of office, the Prime Minister became thoroughly indifferent towards accountability. That gave a direction for the rest of the government machinery to follow. Corruption became a joke or a means to harass opponents. It turned into a way of life.

• Three centers of power have emerged on the political scenario of Pakistan -President, Prime Minister and the army chief. The most effective of these is the army chief. And, above all is the US which is serving these days like the Khalifa of the past who used to issue letters of credence to the governors, minor kings and viceroys of the empire in its physical or ideological domain.

• The late Bhutto in his 1973 constitution knocked off the chapter that existed in all earlier constitutions giving guarantee of service to the civil servants. Bhutto wanted to cut down the arrogance and independence of bureaucrats.They became, therefore, subservient to the politicians. The bureaucracy having thus been politicized, and having lost its sense of security, and made to realize its tenuous position by the wholesale dismissal of officers on charges of corruption, misconduct and/or inefficiency, government functionaries found it advisable to join the politicians in robbing dry the government coffers and for indulging in all forms of corruption.They sought security in wealth. Rampant corruption became the order of the day.

These are but a few points of interest culled from the book. The book was written and published much before the recent military take over. What is happening now in the country creates a strong feeling of déjà vu. One hopes that the current feeling of euphoria on the removal of Nawaz Sharif’s corrupt regime continues justifiably for a long time and the new leadership applies itself to the job of cleansing the stables with all sincerity and industry. As Gen. Pervez Musharraf has said there is no dearth of talent or resources in the country, what is needed is selfless leadership, and self-less effort. The system, not the faces, need must change. To labor and live well should replace the prevalent system of exploitative, free-loading landed aristocracy, and the corrupt and lazy bureaucracy. Inspiration comes from the top. So, accountability has to work from the top down.