Who are these “Taliban”, these students of religious seminaries(madaris), who emerged from nowhere in the autumn of 1994, laid down books, picked up arms and turned into a mysterious army that went on capturing village after village, city after city, province after province, till they had under their writ over eighty percent of war-torn Afghanistan? Interestingly enough, they kept advancing without notable resistance and their ranks kept expanding as the erstwhile freedom fighters belonging to different political groups and even the former communists voluntarily joined them.

Various countries within and without the region viewed this phenomenon from their narrow, nationalistic viewpoint. Iran, for instance, saw it as the creation of the “Great Satan”, the US, to keep the influence of Iran and Russia away from Afghanistan. The Indians projected it as the creation of Pakistan to serve as the breeding ground for the export of “Islamic terrorism” to Kashmir and elsewhere.

A book, The Taliban Phenomenon, published recently (1999) by the Oxford University Press, presents an objective and well-documented account of this development and its implications. Written by Lt.-Gen(Retired) Kamal Matinuddin, it is yet the most authentic work on the recent developments in Afghanistan.

The author’s long military career has enabled him to have a clearer grasp of the military aspects of the problem. His diplomatic assignments, including that of Ambassador in Thailand, and his research works as head of the Institute of Strategic Studies, Islamabad, have further sharpened his the subtlety of intellect and his tools of modern research.This is his fourth book.

As for the origin of the Taliban movement, the author points out that various factions of the mujahideen had been unable to arrive at a consensus regarding the political shape of things in the post-Soviet era. A continuous fight for power had ensued among them. Fifty thousand Afghans were killed in the struggle for power between the militias of Hikmetyar and Rabbani.

People had grown disgusted with their leaders who had been making and breaking alliances overnight. They did not respect even the agreement signed by them in the precincts of holy Kaaba. Several erstwhile commanders, being well armed, had turned into gangsters, indulging in corruption, robberies, murders, drug trafficking and rapes.

A young Jihad veteran, Mullah Omar from Kandahar who had gone back to his school following the withdrawal of Soviet forces, saw a Herati family looted, raped and killed at a check point north of Kandahar by local mujahideen turned bandits. This was revolting for him as it was totally against the Islamic teachings he had been nurtured on in his school. On his call, some other Taliban, products of similar crucibles, flocked to him and the movement was launched.

Mullah Omar, 38, is a towering 6 ft. 6 inches, muscular Pushtun with a flowing black beard. He was injured four times during the war against the Soviets and had lost an eye in combat. He refuses to have an artificial eye, an aversion perhaps to cosmetics.

The war-weary people joined en mass the movement which promised them security from the self-appointed, self-seeking warlords. They had no weapons, but a well-wisher opened his armory to them. This was their first acquisition of arms. Several war veterans had joined their ranks who could handle weapons and train others. They captured an arms and ammunition dump of Hikmatyar. Afghan war veterans and former communists who were in Afghan armed forces joined the Taliban. Many were well-trained pilots, artillerymen and tank crews.

Taliban leaders led an austere life which contrasted conspicuously with the luxurious life style of the warlords. Their usual tactic, when closing on the opposition, was to send some of their representatives with the Taliban flag in one hand and the Quran in the other. They would approach the opposing militia fighters and ask them to lay down their arms as the Taliban had come to restore peace and end all fighting. In most cases their message was accepted, since the Taliban were a neutral force with no hidden agenda.

Usually they took control of cities without a shot being fired. City after city came into their fold and their stock of arms and ammunition kept mounting. The internecine, fratricidal war in these areas came to an end. This set an example for the war-tired people of the other cities to follow.The process continued till eighty per cent of the country came under their sway.

On the othr hand, President Rabbani, Gen. Dostum of the Uzbek militia and commander Ahmad Shah Masood of Panjsher valley joined hands in northern Afghanistan to stem the tide of the Taliban. They accused Pakistan of providing the sinews to the students’ movements. Moral and material support was extended to them by India and Iran. Indian support evidently emanated from its desire to have a finger in the pie apart from an interest in Central Asian oil and gas.The Iranian stance was based on the fact that 14 percent of the Afghans were Shias and most of them lived in northern provinces. Iran also has a stake in the oil and gas of the region. It wants the pipelines to go through its territory to the outlet in the Persian Gulf.

Pakistan’s objectives, ever since the power struggle among rival Afghan militia began, have been: Durable peace in the war-ravaged land; a friendly government across its western border; repatriation of Afghan refugees; access to Central Asian markets; and a safe route for the oil and gas pipeline from Turkmenistan to the Arabian Sea.

Turkmenistan’s Karakorum desert is believed to hold the third largest gas reserves in the world , some 3 trillion cubic meters, and has estimated oil reserves of 6 billion barrels. The shortest route to the open sea from Turkmesistan is through Afghanistan and Pakistan. Taliban have the control of the area where the pipeline is projected to be laid. UNOCOL of the US is to build the pipe and gas lines under agreements. But no work can be undertaken till peace and stability reigns in the region.

The recent oil discoveries, next only to Saudi Arabia in quantities, in the Caspian Sea region have also added to the scramble for access to the reserves by Iran, Turkey, Russia, China, the US apart from the regional states. Peace and stability in Afghanistan is a pre-requisite for the oil and gas projects to be carries out. These would bring considerable revenue to Pakistan.

Durable peace in Afghanistan requires the abandoning of the politics of domination and exclusion, and a genuine national reconciliation among all the political and ethnic segments of the Afghan society.

Pakistan expended its resources and energies for a decade in fighting against the Soviets in Afghanistan. Its fight against poverty, the prime national objective, had to take a secondary place. The country’s enormous debt, defense spending, and the present economic mess are in no small measure a legacy of that war. The Soviet Union collapsed: Pakistan too is groggy. Its interest in early resolution of the internecine strife in Afghanistan is thus quite understandable.

To view and present this concern as a tilt towards the Taliban for an ultra-religious objective is as illogical as it is unfair. Barring a few fanatic religious leaders, who in any case have never been favored by the voters, the people at large do not share the obscurantism, in the garb of puritan Islamic practices, of the Taliban.

The middle class intelligentsia, having been exposed to modern education and which has always played the leading role in identifying the preferred path for the country, looks askance at the haywire fanaticism of the Taliban.

The current mood of the Taliban is evidently a reaction to the life of crime and impiety of the warlords. Moderate and meaningful views will prevail once the political turmoil yields to peace and stability.

The author of the book, Gen. Matinuddin, has correctly pointed out that, with ninety per cent illiteracy, a fiercely independent nature, a fickle and mercurial temperament, and a strong grip on them of the semi-educated mullahs, the Afghans “fell victim to their own dogmatic beliefs.” This coupled with the availability of weapons made it difficult for them to develop a consensus as to a stable political dispensation.

The advent of Taliban has eliminated many political groups and warlords. Now reconciliation remains to be achieved only between the Taliban and the United Front that includes the factions of Rabbani, Masood and Dostum all of the northern provinces. A high-powered delegation of Pakistan has been engaged in shuttle diplomacy between these factions and on September 15, 1999 it was announced in Islamabad that both had positively responded to the initiatives of the delegation. It may take time but the idea of a national reconciliation has taken firm roots.

The fears of a fall out of Taliban-type fanaticism in regional Muslim states is too apprehensive to merit serious consideration. Peace and stability in Afghanistan is as much in Pakistan’s interest as it is in Afghanistan’s. And, with stability will come moderation.

For a deeper study of the Taliban issue, a study of Gen. Matinuddin’s book may be a good investment of time.