Premier Nawaz Sharif is now in China on a 6-day working visit, which began on Sunday, June 27, 1999. That he elected to be away from the country for a week indicates that the shoot-out in the Himalayas is unlikely to escalate into a full-fledged war despite the war hysteria generated in India by the BJP and the Congress in particular to expand their respective vote banks to cash the goodwill thus gained in the general elections to be held after only two months.

The visit, nevertheless, assumes a special significance when seen against the backdrop of the talks last week in Islamabad by Gen. Anthony Zinni, C-in-C of the US Central Command and the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, Gibson Lanpher, to defuse the tension and the subsequent visit of the latter to New Delhi to pursue further the same aim. Relevant are also the intense efforts by both India and Pakistan to win the views of world leaders to their own respective points of view.

India, which jumped the diplomatic gun, maintains that Kargil is the crux of the problem while Pakistan argues that Kargil is but symptomatic of the real and main cause of the conflict, that is Kashmir. Two wars have been fought over it, and Kargil may turn out to be the flash point for the third. Some 50,000 Kashmiris have laid down their lives in the past ten years in the struggle within the state itself for their rights.

Though a late starter, Pakistan has sent emissaries to various world capitals to put across its point of view. The Governor of Punjab was in Washington last week where he met political leaders as well as the media. But, the US had already demanded of Pakistan to withdraw the “infiltrators” from the peaks they had occupied, restoring the status quo ante. That the so-called infiltrators were actually indigenous Kashmiri freedom fighters, not under the command of Pakistan, was not endorsed. The G-8 resolution also was not quite favorable to Pakistan, although the spin-doctors of the Foreign Office projected it differently through their own prism.

From all available indications, the US delegation’s efforts are likely to bear fruit and some common ground for defusing the tension and on the modus operandi for the solution of the real problem, appears to have been found. Whatever be the real position, Pakistan does need now all the support it can get from the international community.

Evidently, China’s political support is vital for Pakistan’s diplomatic campaign aimed at seeking greater international involvement for an abiding solution of the Kashmir issue.

Pakistan was one of the first countries to recognize China soon after its emergence as an independent, sovereign, socialist state in 1949. And, it has enjoyed exemplary relations with China for thirty-seven years and served as a bridge between China and the US for President Nixon’s visit. It has always had very close relations with both countries. The cooperation with the US was at its zenith during the Afghan war which culminated in the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of Cold War.

Pakistan’s steady friendship with the US alienated it from the Soviet Union which backed its ally, India, within or without the UN, on all Indo-Pakistan issues including Kashmir –a major cause for the issue hanging fire till today. The only interlude in this anti-Pakistan, pro-India bias of the Soviet Union was in 1966 when it played a mediator role at the summit leading to the Tashkent declaration. Even this role was probably guided by the tacit agreement between the Soviet Union and the US to reduce Pakistan’s dependence on China. It was just two months back, April 19-22, 1999, that Nawaz Sharif visited Russia and normalized relations with that country.

Unlike the US foreign policy practitioners who, more often than not, view issues in a short-term perspective, the Chinese take a far-sighted view of things. Hence, there has hardly been any up or down in Pakistan’s relationship with that country.

Every President since Nixon has declared that cooperation with China should be a crucial feature of US foreign policy. Concrete measures in pursuance of this policy have, however, been conspicuous by their absence. The fears China inspires come in the way of any such move. For years it has been enjoying a favorable and vast trade balance with the US, next only to Japan.

It presents a strange spectacle of the most populous nation in the world growing economically at an average rate of 10 per cent a year over a period of 20 years. That is probably the source of what is taken as a challenge by the West.

Many here is the United States would recommend plugging in China into the slot of an adversary vacated by the Soviet Union. That raises the questions: Should the growth be stifled by restricting trade as well as the transfer of technology? Should pressure be mounted on China to alter its communist system and improve its record of human rights? At the moment the path taken appears to be in that very direction.

Chinese Premier Zhu Rongi, during his visit to the US last April, could not convince Clinton administration to support his country’s bid to seek admission to the World Trade Organization as a developing country. The US wants China to open its markets for more imports to reduce the adverse balance of trade.

The Chinese order for a hi-tech computer, priced at hundreds of millions of dollars, was also not allowed to be filled. American leaders and media keep talking of Chinese record of human rights violations. The US-China relations are, in short, now under strain. This provides Nawaz Sharif an excellent opportunity to play some role in smoothing out the angularities in Sino-US relations. Pakistan stands to benefit from friction-free relations between the US and China.

As for the Sino-Indian relations, they have been in a spin since India’s nuclear explosion in May, 1998, and the provocative statement of the Indian Defense Minister, George Fernandes specifically describing China as a potential enemy and number one security threat to India. Prime Minister Vajpayee named China as a threat to India and the “primary cause” of his country’s decision to weaponize its nuclear capability. Beijing had reacted strongly to what it viewed as an effort to use an imaginary threat from China to justify its nuclear ambitions. It is no secret that the desire to acquire a key position in the Asian balance of power was the most important consideration that drove the Vajpayee administration to come out of nuclear closet and conduct the tests. It is also quite evident that the ultimate objective of the Indian strategy is to get out of the confines of the subcontinent and play a larger role in Asia and the world. It is this ambition that has created strains between India and all its neighbors. P

akistan, on the other hand, has quite friendly relations with all its neighbors with the exception of India.

Although Nawaz Sharif’s visit was planned much before the Kargil conflict, he might take the opportunity to review all these matters with his Chinese counterpart with a view to evolving a mutually acceptable strategy to promote their joint interests in the current situation.

China’s Defense Minister, Gen. Chi Haotian, who held talks with Nawaz Sharif the very day parleys were held between the Premiers of India and Pakistan leading to the Lahore Declaration, has aptly described his country’s ties with Pakistan in a poetic phrase. He said: “The force of the wind tests the strength of the grass, and time reveals a person’s heart. Sino-Pakistan friendship has gone through the tests of time and changes of situation.” The Kargil conflict poses another test. The outcome of the visit will show the extent of the strength of the grass.