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April 16, 2004
Would the NSC Buttress or Besiege Democracy?
The National Assembly of Pakistan (the lower house)-approved by a majority vote on April 7, 2004, the bill setting up the controversial National Security Council. The bill was passed in an atmosphere of heightened emotions, with members shouting invectives at one another, the kettles calling the pots black, and both creating such a pandemonium that an outsider couldn’t avoid feeling that the Assembly perhaps got what it well-deserved.
The proposal to set up such a Council had been mooted time and again for decades past. Every time, it was dusted and brought up for consideration, it had to be re-shelved as the army leadership was advised by the cooperating civil politicians that it would vitiate the harmony between the two sectors and would spark avoidable tension in the polity. Even Gen. Ziaul Haq who enjoyed the full support of Western democracies as the leader of a front line state in the Afghan war, and who had the backing of a nominated Assembly, decided on the advice of the same Assembly to ignore the army’s bid for the NSC.
The next army chief, Mirza Aslam Beg, pretentiously declared that he had already taken certain steps which would obviate the need for the Army’s intervention in civil polity or the formation of a National Security Council. Gen. Jehangir Karamat pointed out the advisablity of setting up such a Council in an address to the Naval War College on October 5, 1998, but soon abandoned the issue considering the adverse reaction of the Nawaz Sharif government.
Fact of the matter is that Pakistan’s armed forces have, ever since the creation of Pakistan, been pressuring the civilian sector for a substantial slice in the governance of the state.
The predicament of Pakistan’s polity has been that the areas that constitute Pakistan now were regarded as the abode of the martial races suited for induction into the British forces. The people consequently developed a respect for authority, both civil and military, and for the man in uniform in particular. The democratic tradition of decision-making through debate and discussion was not nurtured in the country.
Dominated by a feudal structure, the feudal spirit permeated all sectors of society. It still does. Birth counts more than merit, a self-made man is regarded as an upstart, obedience to the laws of the land is considered a weakness, and usurpation of power and pelf is condoned if not regarded as a sign of courage.
The political history of Pakistan from 1947 to 1988 presents a sequence of coups. From 1951 to 1954, the country witnessed three coups staged by the powerful civil bureaucracy with the army watching these wistfully from the wings.
In October 1951 the Governor-General of Pakistan, Khawaja Nazimuddin was asked to step down making room for Ghulam Muhammad, a civil servant. In April 1953 Mr. Nazimuddin was abruptly dismissed and Mohammed Ali Bogra was summoned from his Washington ambassadorship to take over as Prime Minister.
Bogra hailed from East Pakistan and the manner he was made to accept the assignment went against his democratic grain. He was my first ambassador and informed me in confidence of the sequence of events. That very afternoon, in a press conference in Ottawa, Canada, he gave vent to his feelings by calling the Governor General “a symbol of a symbol” inferring that he had no constitutional powers to dismiss an elected Prime Minister and the Constituent Assembly/parliament. The dissolution of the Assembly by the Governor-General was validated by the Supreme Court on a technical ground. Later it was justified on the “doctrine of necessity” - a ruling that has served as a valid precedent to justify all subsequent military takeovers. Pakistan has been reeling for the past half a century under the impact of this mind-boggling doctrine.
It has tempted army Generals to stage coups and take over the administration of the country. There have been four military interventions -in 1958, 1969, 1977, and 1999 - the total period of military domination nearing 30 years. The army has developed the habit of periodical takeovers and the people the habit of living under the shadow of the army.
The ruling Generals regarded the army as their constituency and did whatever they could to strengthen it vis-à-vis the civil institutions of the country with the result that military presence is felt in almost all walks of life - in civil services, in industry and trade, in real estate, in banking and finance, in education, in health and other social sectors. The military has thus an inherent interest in access to power and its retention, direct or indirect, with the men in uniform.
A book “Pakistan’s Political Experience and Future Prospects” published in February 1993, following extensive interviews with eminent political figures and media, academia, military and intellectual personalities of the country, points out that out of the three pillars of Pakistan’s society - polity, bureaucracy and military - polity has always been the weakest. For, during the colonial period, as already mentioned above, the area now constituting Pakistan was found suited to an authoritarian/Viceregal system of governance. Rule through debate and discussion and the development of a viable polity were ignored while the civil and military bureaucracies were appropriately developed.
Since the people of East Pakistan had been, like many other parts of British India, nurtured on the concept of the equality of man and governance through debate and consensus, this dichotomy in addition to some other factors was bound to lead to a separation of the two parts. Gen. Ayub Khan was perhaps not taking into account the situation in East Pakistan when he declared: “Democracy does not suit the genius of the people of Pakistan”. Yet, he had to give to the country a constitution, withdraw martial law, and introduce democratic institutions called Basic Democracies.
The civil leaders who came into power since the separation of the eastern wing, miserably failed in strengthening democratic institutions in the country. Mr. Bhutto, who talked the most about democracy, elected to be the Chief Martial Law Administrator for two years. He even donned a uniform resembling that of a General. He declared that the press was free to criticize anything or anyone except himself. “I am the only holy cow”, he maintained. The treatment he meted out to J.A. Rahim, his own party’s Secretary-General, for a minor misdemeanor, reflected his vindictive, arrogant and dictatorial conduct. He used to call Gen. Zia “My monkey General.”
Later, when his daughter succeeded him, she too turned out to be an arrogant feudal lady who talked all the time about democracy but paid little heed to strengthening democratic institutions. Now that she is in political wilderness, she talks of democracy all the time as if the term stood as a synonym of Benazir.
Nawaz Sharif had systematically undermined civil institutions - ousting the President and the Chief Justice, trying to shackle the press and opting for religious laws to strengthen his hold on the country.
The present government of Mr. Jamali is so meek and subservient that it would be thoroughly naïve to expect it to take any measure to strengthen the civil institutions vis-à-vis the military. Survival till the end of its five-year term appears to be its prime objective - perhaps not a bad aim in the circumstances.
The conduct of the opposition has been quite lamentable. Members of the ARD and the MMA have treated the Assembly hall for creating a rumpus and for derogating its august status. There has been no worthwhile discussion, no worthwhile legislation that would add to the dignity of the institution. The PPPP and the ML (N) have just a two-point agenda: oust Musharraf and bring back Benazir and Nawaz Sharif.
Had the leaders of the opposition opted for a sober and intellectually more competent and convincing performance, instead of the shrills and shouts of street agitators, the government would have been, like in the past, reluctant to press ahead with the NSC bill.
Now that the bill has been passed, one sincerely hopes that it would buttress democracy as held out by the government benches instead of subjugating the Assembly to the will of the armed forces. One also hopes that sanity would prevail and, as Gen. Musharraf likes to say, the interests of Pakistan would override all other considerations.
(arifhussaini@hotmail.com April 8, 2004)
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