Pakistan Link - Letter & Opinion

By Dr Afzal Mirza

From Ottawa Mr. Khan was again moved to China but this time as ambassador to replace Gen. Raza. The order was conveyed to him by Foreign Secretary Aziz Ahmad and it appears from the events related in the book that Khan and Ahmad had a sort of mutual antipathy.

The period after the Tashkent Agreement and the dismemberment of Pakistan spans over four to five years during which Mr. Khan was either in Beijing or Washington or in Karachi holding very important positions of ambassadorship or Foreign Secretary. This is also the most critical period in the history of Pakistan and China. During this period China embarked on its Cultural Revolution.

It was the thinking of Mao Tse Tung that all the revolutions become stale after some time and in order to keep the revolutionary process going some sort of mini-revolutions should be engineered. It is just as the turbulence keeps the seawater clean. The basic onslaught in the Chinese Cultural Revolution was on corruption and every leader big or small was made accountable. The process entailed many dangers. The chaos and turmoil that followed could have taken the path of a civil war resulting in the victory of counter-revolutionaries. Mao was a demagogue but the most concerned man was Chou En Lai who was the most worried person in China.

After the Tashkent Agreement supervised by Russians there was a thaw in the Pakistan-China relations as well. China had done so much for Pakistan in the 1960s that the Chinese were unhappy with Pakistan’s acceptance of the tutelage of Russia to broker peace between India and Pakistan when the whole world knew the Russian soft corner for India. It was at this juncture that Khan had to plead his country’s case with the Chinese. He made good use of his earlier acquaintance with the Chinese especially with Chou when other leaders like Chen Yi and Liu Shao Chi were under the cloud. On the other hand the false sense of stability created by Ayub was also fast eroding in Pakistan after Bhutto’s revolt.

Khan kept a good record of his meetings with Chou and gives an extensive account of his thoughts on various subjects of mutual importance. Chou’s best commentary was on the frivolous wars that Pakistan fought. Khan tells us of a meeting of Chou with Pakistani Generals in which Chou’s point of view is given in the following words, “ ‘Please forgive me,’ Chou En-lai said, ‘I appear to be confused by your reply. But if the outcome of a conflict has been pre-determined to be a restoration of the status quo, then why fight at all? Why unnecessarily waste human lives and economic resources? Wars cannot be fought according to a timetable, and one has to be ready for a prolonged conflict.’ There was no answer from our side.”

Then Chou gave them a long lecture on war tactics. Khan thinks that “unfortunately his words were not falling on receptive ears.” The leader of the delegation was of the view as to “What does Chou En-lai know about soldiering and military affairs anyway?” Khan then hastens to tell us, “I was amazed by his ignorance and surprised that he had not bothered to read the brief on Chou El-lai provided by the embassy. So I reminded him that Chou En-lai had fought in more battles than one could count.”

Khan is all praise for Chou. “My relationship with Chou En-lai speaks for itself … the Danish ambassador asked me how many times I had met Chou En-lai, I said that I had not kept count but may be as many times as there had been a need to see him. With unconcealed envy, the Ambassador remarked that he had been six months in Beijing and had not been able to meet Chou En-lai.”

Mr. Khan returned to Pakistan in January 1969 as Additional Foreign Secretary. It was the time that Ayub Khan was on his way out as a result of a popular movement. But the biggest blunder that he made was to hand over power to his Commander-in-Chief Gen. Yahya Khan instead of the Speaker of the National Assembly as laid down in the 1962 Constitution. This step accelerated the process of disintegration because after ten years of Ayub Khan (a West Pakistani)’s rule, an East Pakistani was again denied the chance to rule the country. In spite of Yahya Khan’s assurances that he was there as a stop-gap arrangement no one was prepared to believe it. Every adventurer says that to start with. Khan says, “He (Yayha) had an established reputation as a competent soldier.” How does it make him a competent Chief of State as well? Mr Khan is right when he says that “One of the most difficult tasks which the Foreign Office and its ambassadors have to carry out is justifying the change in the political scene at home to the rest of the world to the effect that it was not only necessary but desirable and in the national interest (sic!), in short to ‘sell’ the new government. It has become the unfortunate lot of Pakistani diplomats to this again and again. Diplomats from countries where parliamentary and democratic institutions have been established just cannot understand what humiliation this involves.”

The secession of East Pakistan has been discussed by many authors and has also been the subject of investigations by many commissions and institutions and many scapegoats have been named for this tragedy but most of these authors are either from the army or civilians associated with Yahya Khan’s regime. Yahya Khan had a coterie of people around him who were his eyes and ears and all the decisions were taken by them. Mujib and Bhutto were two political leaders who had not joined politics for social work. Naturally their purpose was to outdo each other and get power. The question was: who held the power? It was Yahya Khan about whom Sultan Khan says, “And what kind of man was Yahya Khan? I am not qualified to comment on his professional capabilities as a General, but I did get to know him as individual as a human being and President.” His “competency” in foreign affairs is evident from Khan’s narration of the events at the Conference of the Head of States of Islamic Countries held in Rabat in 1969 where Yahya agreed with King Faisal’s proposal to allow India to attend the Conference and immediately India’s Sikh ambassador was allowed to occupy a seat in the Conference of Muslims. It was only at the insistence of Pakistani journalists covering the Conference that Yahya back-tracked and the situation was saved. There are stories and stories of Yahya’s behaviour on foreign tours which Khan has not told. Thus Khan summarizes, “On the whole the treatment of the Foreign office was friendly and considerate and personally I never experienced any difficulty in dealing with him .” What difficulty would he have expected from such a man?

One of the major events of that period was the acting of Pakistan as a conduit for a meeting of America and China. Khan gives a detailed account of this unusual happening at a time when both the countries, that is USA and China were at daggers drawn and the Chiang Kai Shek’s Taiwanese regime was the favorite of the former. Undoubtedly it was an American idea and Pakistan did nothing but to provide transport and opportunity to carry it out and it is ironical that a lot of Pakistani officials claim credit for it. But the question is credit for what? Yahya’s intention to cling to power after general elections are made known by Khan referring to Chou En-lai’s speech during Yahya’s state visit to China wherein he said that he “accepted the invitation but would come after the elections in Pakistan when Yahya Khan would have been elected as President.” This statement would have intrigued the rest of the members of the Pakistan delegation.

Regarding Bhutto’s diplomacy at UN during that time Mr Khan says, “Bhutto was playing a political game with Yahya Khan. If by prolonging the conflict he could achieve a satisfactory solution through the UN he would claim the credit for saving Pakistan and he could cite it in his tough messages to show that but for his intervention the generals had agreed to surrender. On the other hand if the army suffered a defeat it could not hold on to power any way and he (Bhutto) as leader of the largest political party in (West Pakistan) would take over the country.” Anyway Khan being the main Foreign Office player during that period has lot of material and has extensively quoted from his official minutes and notes. Mr. Bhutto has been criticized by his opponents for not accepting the Polish Resolution but Khan says that, “In brief it (Polish Resolution) provided for transfer of power in East Pakistan to lawfully elected representatives of the people headed by Mujibur Rehman; immediately after the beginning of that process the ceas fire would start followed by withdrawals and the subsequent evacuation of Pakistani forces but the withdrawal of Indian forces was made contingent upon consultations with the newly formed government headed by Mujibur Rehman.”

During Bhutto’s period Mr. Khan worked until 1976 when he was probably prematurely retired. It appears that he did not like Bhutto’s style of governance. Worst of all his old “friend” Aziz Ahmad was recalled from retirement to be Secretary General of Foreign Affairs Ministry and Khan had earlier also shown his dislike for him as Mr Khan had a long experience in Foreign Affairs and was a career diplomat. He had his own views on the running of the Foreign Affairs Ministry. He was always disturbed when a non-diplomat or a politician Foreign Minister tried to make changes in the system.

For example, he has shown his disapproval of Manzoor Qadir’s bid to change the system. Mr. Bhutto, on the other hand, actually inducted outsiders into the Ministry breaking the strength of the so-called career diplomats. After the fall of Bhutto, Ziaul Haq recalled him and amply compensated him as he did to all anti-Bhutto elements.

Mr. Khan says that he is writing another book on Ziaul Haq’s period. It would be an interesting account from a person so close to Ziaul Haq. The present book is indubitably written in a beautiful style substantiated by quotations from his notes and diaries and would be a useful document for future historians of Pakistan . At the same time they will have to read books written by other writers to frame a profound opinion of their own. It is indeed a bureaucrat’s point of view who spent his whole life in government service and who was trained in a typical bureaucratic system.


	Memories and Reflections of a Diplomat - 3 By Dr Afzal Mirza CA From Ottawa Mr. Khan was again moved to China but this time as ambassador to replace Gen. Raza. The order was conveyed to him by Foreign Secretary Aziz Ahmad and it appears from the events related in the book that Khan and Ahmad had a sort of mutual antipathy. The period after the Tashkent Agreement and the dismemberment of Pakistan spans over four to five years during which Mr. Khan was either in Beijing or Washington or in Karachi holding very important positions of ambassadorship or Foreign Secretary. This is also the most critical period in the history of Pakistan and China. During this period China embarked on its Cultural Revolution. It was the thinking of Mao Tse Tung that all the revolutions become stale after some time and in order to keep the revolutionary process going some sort of mini-revolutions should be engineered. It is just as the turbulence keeps the seawater clean. The basic onslaught in the Chinese Cultural Revolution was on corruption and every leader big or small was made accountable. The process entailed many dangers. The chaos and turmoil that followed could have taken the path of a civil war resulting in the victory of counter-revolutionaries. Mao was a demagogue but the most concerned man was Chou En Lai who was the most worried person in China. After the Tashkent Agreement supervised by Russians there was a thaw in the Pakistan-China relations as well. China had done so much for Pakistan in the 1960s that the Chinese were unhappy with Pakistan’s acceptance of the tutelage of Russia to broker peace between India and Pakistan when the whole world knew the Russian soft corner for India. It was at this juncture that Khan had to plead his country’s case with the Chinese. He made good use of his earlier acquaintance with the Chinese especially with Chou when other leaders like Chen Yi and Liu Shao Chi were under the cloud. On the other hand the false sense of stability created by Ayub was also fast eroding in Pakistan after Bhutto’s revolt. Khan kept a good record of his meetings with Chou and gives an extensive account of his thoughts on various subjects of mutual importance. Chou’s best commentary was on the frivolous wars that Pakistan fought. Khan tells us of a meeting of Chou with Pakistani Generals in which Chou’s point of view is given in the following words, “ ‘Please forgive me,’ Chou En-lai said, ‘I appear to be confused by your reply. But if the outcome of a conflict has been pre-determined to be a restoration of the status quo, then why fight at all? Why unnecessarily waste human lives and economic resources? Wars cannot be fought according to a timetable, and one has to be ready for a prolonged conflict.’ There was no answer from our side.” Then Chou gave them a long lecture on war tactics. Khan thinks that “unfortunately his words were not falling on receptive ears.” The leader of the delegation was of the view as to “What does Chou En-lai know about soldiering and military affairs anyway?” Khan then hastens to tell us, “I was amazed by his ignorance and surprised that he had not bothered to read the brief on Chou El-lai provided by the embassy. So I reminded him that Chou En-lai had fought in more battles than one could count.” Khan is all praise for Chou. “My relationship with Chou En-lai speaks for itself … the Danish ambassador asked me how many times I had met Chou En-lai, I said that I had not kept count but may be as many times as there had been a need to see him. With unconcealed envy, the Ambassador remarked that he had been six months in Beijing and had not been able to meet Chou En-lai.” Mr. Khan returned to Pakistan in January 1969 as Additional Foreign Secretary. It was the time that Ayub Khan was on his way out as a result of a popular movement. But the biggest blunder that he made was to hand over power to his Commander-in-Chief Gen. Yahya Khan instead of the Speaker of the National Assembly as laid down in the 1962 Constitution. This step accelerated the process of disintegration because after ten years of Ayub Khan (a West Pakistani)’s rule, an East Pakistani was again denied the chance to rule the country. In spite of Yahya Khan’s assurances that he was there as a stop-gap arrangement no one was prepared to believe it. Every adventurer says that to start with. Khan says, “He (Yayha) had an established reputation as a competent soldier.” How does it make him a competent Chief of State as well? Mr Khan is right when he says that “One of the most difficult tasks which the Foreign Office and its ambassadors have to carry out is justifying the change in the political scene at home to the rest of the world to the effect that it was not only necessary but desirable and in the national interest (sic!), in short to ‘sell’ the new government. It has become the unfortunate lot of Pakistani diplomats to this again and again. Diplomats from countries where parliamentary and democratic institutions have been established just cannot understand what humiliation this involves.” The secession of East Pakistan has been discussed by many authors and has also been the subject of investigations by many commissions and institutions and many scapegoats have been named for this tragedy but most of these authors are either from the army or civilians associated with Yahya Khan’s regime. Yahya Khan had a coterie of people around him who were his eyes and ears and all the decisions were taken by them. Mujib and Bhutto were two political leaders who had not joined politics for social work. Naturally their purpose was to outdo each other and get power. The question was: who held the power? It was Yahya Khan about whom Sultan Khan says, “And what kind of man was Yahya Khan? I am not qualified to comment on his professional capabilities as a General, but I did get to know him as individual as a human being and President.” His “competency” in foreign affairs is evident from Khan’s narration of the events at the Conference of the Head of States of Islamic Countries held in Rabat in 1969 where Yahya agreed with King Faisal’s proposal to allow India to attend the Conference and immediately India’s Sikh ambassador was allowed to occupy a seat in the Conference of Muslims. It was only at the insistence of Pakistani journalists covering the Conference that Yahya back-tracked and the situation was saved. There are stories and stories of Yahya’s behaviour on foreign tours which Khan has not told. Thus Khan summarizes, “On the whole the treatment of the Foreign office was friendly and considerate and personally I never experienced any difficulty in dealing with him .” What difficulty would he have expected from such a man? One of the major events of that period was the acting of Pakistan as a conduit for a meeting of America and China. Khan gives a detailed account of this unusual happening at a time when both the countries, that is USA and China were at daggers drawn and the Chiang Kai Shek’s Taiwanese regime was the favorite of the former. Undoubtedly it was an American idea and Pakistan did nothing but to provide transport and opportunity to carry it out and it is ironical that a lot of Pakistani officials claim credit for it. But the question is credit for what? Yahya’s intention to cling to power after general elections are made known by Khan referring to Chou En-lai’s speech during Yahya’s state visit to China wherein he said that he “accepted the invitation but would come after the elections in Pakistan when Yahya Khan would have been elected as President.” This statement would have intrigued the rest of the members of the Pakistan delegation. Regarding Bhutto’s diplomacy at UN during that time Mr Khan says, “Bhutto was playing a political game with Yahya Khan. If by prolonging the conflict he could achieve a satisfactory solution through the UN he would claim the credit for saving Pakistan and he could cite it in his tough messages to show that but for his intervention the generals had agreed to surrender. On the other hand if the army suffered a defeat it could not hold on to power any way and he (Bhutto) as leader of the largest political party in (West Pakistan) would take over the country.” Anyway Khan being the main Foreign Office player during that period has lot of material and has extensively quoted from his official minutes and notes. Mr. Bhutto has been criticized by his opponents for not accepting the Polish Resolution but Khan says that, “In brief it (Polish Resolution) provided for transfer of power in East Pakistan to lawfully elected representatives of the people headed by Mujibur Rehman; immediately after the beginning of that process the ceas fire would start followed by withdrawals and the subsequent evacuation of Pakistani forces but the withdrawal of Indian forces was made contingent upon consultations with the newly formed government headed by Mujibur Rehman.” During Bhutto’s period Mr. Khan worked until 1976 when he was probably prematurely retired. It appears that he did not like Bhutto’s style of governance. Worst of all his old “friend” Aziz Ahmad was recalled from retirement to be Secretary General of Foreign Affairs Ministry and Khan had earlier also shown his dislike for him as Mr Khan had a long experience in Foreign Affairs and was a career diplomat. He had his own views on the running of the Foreign Affairs Ministry. He was always disturbed when a non-diplomat or a politician Foreign Minister tried to make changes in the system. For example, he has shown his disapproval of Manzoor Qadir’s bid to change the system. Mr. Bhutto, on the other hand, actually inducted outsiders into the Ministry breaking the strength of the so-called career diplomats. After the fall of Bhutto, Ziaul Haq recalled him and amply compensated him as he did to all anti-Bhutto elements. Mr. Khan says that he is writing another book on Ziaul Haq’s period. It would be an interesting account from a person so close to Ziaul Haq. The present book is indubitably written in a beautiful style substantiated by quotations from his notes and diaries and would be a useful document for future historians of Pakistan . At the same time they will have to read books written by other writers to frame a profound opinion of their own. It is indeed a bureaucrat’s point of view who spent his whole life in government service and who was trained in a typical bureaucratic system.
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