Pakistan Link - Letter & Opinion

By Ahmed Quraishi

Islamabad, Pakistan

In our national debate over defense spending, critics often overlook a basic fact: In a mere five decades, and with very little resources, Pakistan managed to change the balance of power in the region with an adversary five times larger. In 2002, we probably made history by driving back the largest hostile military mobilization by one country against another in modern times.

That was probably also the first time that a smaller nation repelled such a massive attempt at coercion without firing a single bullet, using the deterrence created by an indigenous defense capability, backed by creative diplomacy. Never before in recorded military history had a large country amassed almost a million of its soldiers on the borders of a far smaller neighbor, kept them there for almost a year to extract concessions, and then was forced to return home empty handed.

We didn’t do it because Alexander the Great came back to life and joined our forces. And we certainly didn’t do it by putting together a Star Wars-type defense budget. The only way this was possible is because we - and especially our armed forces - intelligently and deftly handled our small resources in a way that maximized returns.

And for a country like Pakistan, born amidst difficult circumstances and thrust from the beginning right into the middle of two tough challenges - building a nation and surviving in a rough neighborhood - what we did and where we stand today militarily is no small feat.

Anyone who has any doubt, consider this:

* Pakistan’s defense expenditure, according to verifiable public figures, has been declining over the last decade or remained stagnant, while our eastern neighbor’s defense budget, for example, increased by almost 100 per cent in the last 10 years

* Pakistani defense spending was maintained at very controllable and reasonable levels over the past fifteen years despite the multiple increase in dollar terms of the cost of military hardware on the international market during the same period

* This was done despite the fact that Pakistan faced tough economic sanctions, especially the ones slapped by the US Congress in 1990 in an attempt to choke the supply line for Pakistan’s American-based weapons systems, and then the 1998 nuclear-related sanctions that unjustly included Islamabad in an essentially Indian crime

* We managed to gain a respectable place in the global defense hierarchy despite the fact that we were ditched by our Cold War ally, Washington, in 1989 and were left to fend for ourselves in a unipolar world

* Defense spending has come down from 21.2 percent in 1999-2000 to 18.8 percent during the current fiscal year 2003-04, as a percentage of total expenditure

* India has allocated approximately 15 billion dollars, almost 6 to 7 times higher than Pakistan’s defense budget, and its defense spending is set to increase manifold in the coming decade despite initiating a peace process with Pakistan

* Yes, there is an increase of 7 percent in defense spending next year compared to this year. But that is, for all practical purposes, a non-issue. Why? Because of the following remarkable fact:

* Our armed forces budget for next year is down to 3.9 percent of GDP compared to this year’s 4.1 of GDP. It means that in overall actual terms, our defense spending is NOT increasing but ACTUALLY decreasing, or staying stagnant

This brings us to our point: We have reached a stage now in our political evolution where defense spending must be de-politicized and protected from political squabbles through a bipartisan consensus.

And that consensus can develop only if all our political players understand that Pakistan’s defense is above the fray. This advice goes particularly to the leftists and the self-styled liberals in our opposition, who came close to crossing the reasonably acceptable red line by exploiting our defense spending for cheap political point scoring.

Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, the great founder of our nuclear program, must be rolling in his grave every time those who claim to carry his mantle oppose genuine defense requirements for the sake of opposition only.

The fact is, our defense stands impregnable today because late Mr Bhutto and all those who came after him stuck to an unspoken consensus that our defense is above the fray. This is why Mr Bhutto never cared that a viable nuclear program would ultimately embolden the military. His aim was to strengthen Pakistan. And that’s why another of our great maverick politicians, the late Gen Ziaul Haq, continued Mr Bhutto’s nuclear legacy regardless of personal differences.

These were great men. We can question their personal politics but we don’t doubt their commitment to Pakistan’s defense. That is the kind of balanced way of looking at things that Islamabad’s politicians need when approaching defense spending.

De-politicising the debate over defense spending doesn’t mean creating one more scared cow in our politics. Pakistan is vigorously pursuing accountability and the military establishment is extending help in fighting corruption, chasing the army’s own corruption suspects all the way to the US, demanding their extradition and seizing their illegal assets. So there’s no basis to worry that de-politicising defense spending might lead to unchecked corruption.

Today we stand divided between two extremist views in our politics when it comes to discussing how we spend our defense money. There is the extreme left that believes we don’t need to put aside any money for defense and should assign all our bombs and missiles to a metal junkyard in a grand gesture of peace. And then there are those who do want a strong defense for Pakistan but criticize the government and the military over defense spending simply because they don’t like someone in the government or the military.

This is the time for President Musharraf and the military leadership to encourage our political class to develop a bipartisan approach that keeps defense spending above political squabbles. Any future debate on this question must be handled with rationality taking into consideration two things: One, that Pakistan has fought three wars, faced and repelled foreign-inspired destructive ideologies, and continues to live in a difficult neighborhood. And two, that to play a constructive regional and international role, Pakistan needs to develop within the limits of reasonable resources an indigenous defense capability and defense industry.

A credible Pakistani defense capability is the best guarantee that economic and political reforms continue internally while Pakistan’s military vibrancy creates a regional balance of power in favor of peace by providing a deterrence that dissuades others from pursuing hegemonic policies detrimental to the region.

An update: Musharraf and the military promised in October 1999 to introduce a new political culture in Pakistan. We saw a glimpse of that over the weekend when the politicians were forced to demonstrate to the people of Pakistan what a peaceful power transition looks like. This is significant because most of those politicians in past years preferred inciting the military against opponents instead of simply accepting power alternation. The military demonstrated it believed in that peaceful transfer of power back in 1989 but our politicians let us all down. We’ll be ready for free-for-all western style democracy the day our politicians learn last week’s power transfer on their own.


	De-Politicise Pak Defense By Ahmed Quraishi Islamabad, Pakistan In our national debate over defense spending, critics often overlook a basic fact: In a mere five decades, and with very little resources, Pakistan managed to change the balance of power in the region with an adversary five times larger. In 2002, we probably made history by driving back the largest hostile military mobilization by one country against another in modern times. That was probably also the first time that a smaller nation repelled such a massive attempt at coercion without firing a single bullet, using the deterrence created by an indigenous defense capability, backed by creative diplomacy. Never before in recorded military history had a large country amassed almost a million of its soldiers on the borders of a far smaller neighbor, kept them there for almost a year to extract concessions, and then was forced to return home empty handed. We didn’t do it because Alexander the Great came back to life and joined our forces. And we certainly didn’t do it by putting together a Star Wars-type defense budget. The only way this was possible is because we - and especially our armed forces - intelligently and deftly handled our small resources in a way that maximized returns. And for a country like Pakistan, born amidst difficult circumstances and thrust from the beginning right into the middle of two tough challenges - building a nation and surviving in a rough neighborhood - what we did and where we stand today militarily is no small feat. Anyone who has any doubt, consider this: * Pakistan’s defense expenditure, according to verifiable public figures, has been declining over the last decade or remained stagnant, while our eastern neighbor’s defense budget, for example, increased by almost 100 per cent in the last 10 years * Pakistani defense spending was maintained at very controllable and reasonable levels over the past fifteen years despite the multiple increase in dollar terms of the cost of military hardware on the international market during the same period * This was done despite the fact that Pakistan faced tough economic sanctions, especially the ones slapped by the US Congress in 1990 in an attempt to choke the supply line for Pakistan’s American-based weapons systems, and then the 1998 nuclear-related sanctions that unjustly included Islamabad in an essentially Indian crime * We managed to gain a respectable place in the global defense hierarchy despite the fact that we were ditched by our Cold War ally, Washington, in 1989 and were left to fend for ourselves in a unipolar world * Defense spending has come down from 21.2 percent in 1999-2000 to 18.8 percent during the current fiscal year 2003-04, as a percentage of total expenditure * India has allocated approximately 15 billion dollars, almost 6 to 7 times higher than Pakistan’s defense budget, and its defense spending is set to increase manifold in the coming decade despite initiating a peace process with Pakistan * Yes, there is an increase of 7 percent in defense spending next year compared to this year. But that is, for all practical purposes, a non-issue. Why? Because of the following remarkable fact: * Our armed forces budget for next year is down to 3.9 percent of GDP compared to this year’s 4.1 of GDP. It means that in overall actual terms, our defense spending is NOT increasing but ACTUALLY decreasing, or staying stagnant This brings us to our point: We have reached a stage now in our political evolution where defense spending must be de-politicized and protected from political squabbles through a bipartisan consensus. And that consensus can develop only if all our political players understand that Pakistan’s defense is above the fray. This advice goes particularly to the leftists and the self-styled liberals in our opposition, who came close to crossing the reasonably acceptable red line by exploiting our defense spending for cheap political point scoring. Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, the great founder of our nuclear program, must be rolling in his grave every time those who claim to carry his mantle oppose genuine defense requirements for the sake of opposition only. The fact is, our defense stands impregnable today because late Mr Bhutto and all those who came after him stuck to an unspoken consensus that our defense is above the fray. This is why Mr Bhutto never cared that a viable nuclear program would ultimately embolden the military. His aim was to strengthen Pakistan. And that’s why another of our great maverick politicians, the late Gen Ziaul Haq, continued Mr Bhutto’s nuclear legacy regardless of personal differences. These were great men. We can question their personal politics but we don’t doubt their commitment to Pakistan’s defense. That is the kind of balanced way of looking at things that Islamabad’s politicians need when approaching defense spending. De-politicising the debate over defense spending doesn’t mean creating one more scared cow in our politics. Pakistan is vigorously pursuing accountability and the military establishment is extending help in fighting corruption, chasing the army’s own corruption suspects all the way to the US, demanding their extradition and seizing their illegal assets. So there’s no basis to worry that de-politicising defense spending might lead to unchecked corruption. Today we stand divided between two extremist views in our politics when it comes to discussing how we spend our defense money. There is the extreme left that believes we don’t need to put aside any money for defense and should assign all our bombs and missiles to a metal junkyard in a grand gesture of peace. And then there are those who do want a strong defense for Pakistan but criticize the government and the military over defense spending simply because they don’t like someone in the government or the military. This is the time for President Musharraf and the military leadership to encourage our political class to develop a bipartisan approach that keeps defense spending above political squabbles. Any future debate on this question must be handled with rationality taking into consideration two things: One, that Pakistan has fought three wars, faced and repelled foreign-inspired destructive ideologies, and continues to live in a difficult neighborhood. And two, that to play a constructive regional and international role, Pakistan needs to develop within the limits of reasonable resources an indigenous defense capability and defense industry. A credible Pakistani defense capability is the best guarantee that economic and political reforms continue internally while Pakistan’s military vibrancy creates a regional balance of power in favor of peace by providing a deterrence that dissuades others from pursuing hegemonic policies detrimental to the region. An update: Musharraf and the military promised in October 1999 to introduce a new political culture in Pakistan. We saw a glimpse of that over the weekend when the politicians were forced to demonstrate to the people of Pakistan what a peaceful power transition looks like. This is significant because most of those politicians in past years preferred inciting the military against opponents instead of simply accepting power alternation. The military demonstrated it believed in that peaceful transfer of power back in 1989 but our politicians let us all down. We’ll be ready for free-for-all western style democracy the day our politicians learn last week’s power transfer on their own.
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